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THE ROLE OF ECONOMICS IN THE 
DISCOURSE ON RLUIPA AND 
NONDISCRIMINATION IN  
RELIGIOUS LAND USE 
Abstract: In the context of land use, the Religious Land Use and Institu-
tionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) allows religious institutions to challenge 
land-use decisions that unfairly discriminate against religious land use. Of 
the various mechanisms in the statute that provide relief, the substantial 
burden and equal terms provisions have created confusion in the courts 
and controversy among scholars. Oftentimes, courts and scholars have 
framed the discussion of RLUIPA’s substantial burden and equal terms 
provisions as a matter of power and control. A law and economics ap-
proach, however, can allow courts and scholars to balance competing 
concerns by weighing them against relevant facts that are specific to each 
community. This Note first discusses the state of the law and scholarship 
on RLUIPA’s substantial burden and equal terms provisions. Then, this 
Note analyzes Judge Richard Posner’s application of these provisions to 
provide a fresh look on RLUIPA’s application. Finally, this Note assesses 
the merits and potential challenges in taking a community-specific, fact-
intensive approach to RLUIPA. Although the economic view is certainly 
not a fail-safe approach, it can at least refract the discussion on RLUIPA’s 
application to open new ways of thinking about religious discrimination 
in land use. 
Introduction 
 Recent controversies surrounding mosques have brought the legal 
implications of religious land use to the forefront of public discussion.1 
In 2010, President Barack Obama sparked public discussion by affirm-
ing the legal right of Muslims to build a mosque near Ground Zero.2 
Beyond the legal issues, politicians have drawn on the highly emotional 
atmosphere and framed the question of mosque location as a political 
                                                                                                                      
1 Ashby Jones, “This Is a Circus”: Tennessee Mosque Trial Takes Strange Turn, Wall St. J.—
L. Blog (Nov. 12, 2010, 9:17 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/11/12/this-is-a-circus-
tennessee-mosque-trial-takes-strange-turns/. 
2 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Says Mosque Upholds Principle of Equal Treatment, N.Y. Times, 
Aug. 14, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/15/us/politics/15islamcenter.html?page 
wanted=all. 
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issue.3 Newt Gingrich, for example, has expressed his view that the 
proposed mosque near Ground Zero represents an Islamic political 
and cultural offensive aimed at American society.4 Themes of power, 
control, and self-assertion pervade this debate.5 
 Likewise, both courts and scholars have framed the conversation 
regarding the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
(RLUIPA)—which, in relevant part, allows religious institutions to cir-
cumvent burdensome zoning restrictions—through both legal and po-
litical lenses.6 In cases involving religious land use, however, the legal 
and political lenses are not so clearly distinguishable.7 Rather, the legal 
analyses of these cases have focused on the policy concerns regarding 
control over land-use regulations.8 Courts and scholars have divided 
over the proper application of RLUIPA’s provisions in religious land-
use cases.9 
 A law and economics approach, however, can refract the debate on 
RLUIPA’s application.10 Economic principles can guide a more fact-
sensitive application of RLUIPA’s provisions.11 Using this approach, 
                                                                                                                      
3 Devin Dwyer, Sarah Palin: Proposed “Mosque” Like a Weapon, ABC News: The Note 
(Aug. 17, 2010, 10:21 AM), http://blogs.abcnews.com/thenote/2010/08/sarah-palin-
proposed-mosque-like-a-weapon.html. 
4 Newt Gingrich, No Mosque at Ground Zero, Hum. Events ( July 28, 2010), http:// 
www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=38282. 
5 See id. 
6 See infra notes 23–130 and accompanying text. This Note will focus on the provisions 
regarding religious nondiscrimination in land-use regulations and not the sections con-
cerning institutionalized persons. See infra notes 23–130 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra notes 23–130 and accompanying text. 
8 See Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 266–69 
(3d Cir. 2007); Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward Cnty., 450 
F.3d 1295, 1308–14 (11th Cir. 2006); Konikov v. Orange Cnty., 410 F.3d 1317, 1324–25 
(11th Cir. 2005); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1230–31 & 
n.14 (11th Cir. 2004); Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago (CLUB), 342 
F.3d 752, 760–61 (7th Cir. 2003). 
9 See Marci A. Hamilton, Why Federalism Must Be Enforced: A Response to Professor Kramer, 
46 Vill. L. Rev. 1069, 1082–83 (2001); Douglas Laycock, State RFRAs and Land Use Regula-
tion, 32 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 755, 775–84 (1999); Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Judicial Review of 
Local Land Use Decisions: Lessons from RLUIPA, 31 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 717, 735–37 
(2008); Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and the Discourse of Religious 
Liberty, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1810, 1844–46 (2004). 
10 See River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 369–71 (7th 
Cir. 2010) (en banc); World Outreach Conference Ctr. v. City of Chicago, 591 F.3d 531, 
539 (7th Cir. 2009); Petra Presbyterian Church v. Vill. of Northbrook, 489 F.3d 846, 851 
(7th Cir. 2007); Saints Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church, Inc. v. City of New 
Berlin, 396 F.3d 895, 899–901 (7th Cir. 2005). 
11 See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 371; World Outreach, 591 F.3d at 539; Saints Constantine, 
396 F.3d at 899–901. 
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courts can better balance competing concerns by weighing them 
against relevant facts that are specific to each affected community.12 
Nevertheless, although the economic approach offers an alternative 
application of RLUIPA, it too is flawed.13 
 In Part I, this Note explores the application of and literature on 
RLUIPA’s “Substantial Burden” and “Equal Terms” provisions.14 This 
Part first describes the background of RLUIPA generally.15 Second, this 
Part maps courts’ disagreements over the application of RLUIPA’s pro-
visions in face of competing concerns regarding who—municipalities 
or religious institutions—should control land-use regulations.16 Third, 
this Part explores the literature on RLUIPA in light of these competing 
concerns over control and power.17 
 Part II recasts the debate through the law and economics lens.18 
This Part observes the use of economic concepts in Judge Richard Pos-
ner’s decisions and dissents.19 This Part argues that the economic ap-
proach can guide a more balanced application of RLUIPA’s provi-
sions.20 Part III argues that the economic approach to RLUIPA’s 
application is also imperfect, particularly in light of the alternative 
Equal Protection Clause analysis.21 Additionally, the economic ap-
proach to RLUIPA’s application raises new tensions which do not exist 
in the power and control framework.22 
I. RLUIPA and the Division Regarding Control Over  
Land-Use Regulations 
 Courts and scholars have divided on the proper application of 
RLUIPA.23 In particular, courts and scholars have had trouble balanc-
ing the competing concerns between municipalities and religious insti-
                                                                                                                      
12 See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 369–71; World Outreach, 591 F.3d at 539; Saints Constantine, 
396 F.3d at 899–901. 
13 See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 372–74; CLUB, 342 F.3d at 768–74 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
14 See infra notes 23–130 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 29–39 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 40–88 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 89–130 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 131–229 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 174–229 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 131–229 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 230–258 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 258–273 and accompanying text. 
23 See Lighthouse Inst., 510 F.3d at 266–69; Primera Iglesia, 450 F.3d at 1308–11; Konikov, 
410 F.3d at 1324–25; Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1230–31; CLUB, 342 F.3d at 760–61; 
Schragger, supra note 9, at 1844–46; see also Laycock, supra note 9, at 775–76, 784 (arguing 
for legislation against discriminatory land-use regulations). 
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tutions regarding who should control land-use regulations.24 The resul-
tant division has created uncertainty in the application of RLUIPA.25 
 In this Part, Section A provides general background on RLUIPA’s 
history.26 Then, Section B discusses how the circuit splits in the applica-
tion of RLUIPA’s various provisions reflect competition for control over 
land-use regulations.27 Finally, Section C discusses how scholars have 
framed the issue in terms of power and control, only to exacerbate the 
division in judicial approaches to applying RLUIPA.28 
A. RLUIPA 
 RLUIPA is the latest chapter in the history of federal legislation 
protecting religious liberty.29 Several years prior to RLUIPA’s enact-
ment, Congress, in 1993, enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act (RFRA).30 RFRA provided that a “substantial burden” on religion 
could only be justified if it was the least restrictive means of furthering a 
compelling state interest.31 The Supreme Court, however, in 1997 in 
City of Boerne v. Flores struck down RFRA as applied to the States because 
it exceeded Congress’s power under the Enforcement Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.32 In part, the Court reasoned that RFRA ex-
ceeded Congress’s authority because it had no termination date, af-
fected all levels of state and federal government, and did not distin-
guish between burdens on religious and nonreligious institutions.33 
 In 2000, Congress enacted RLUIPA, which narrowly addresses only 
land-use regulations and the religious rights of institutionalized per-
sons.34 As applied, scholars have pointed out a number of issues with 
                                                                                                                      
24 See Lighthouse Inst., 510 F.3d at 266–69; Primera Iglesia, 450 F.3d at 1308–11; Konikov, 
410 F.3d at 1324–25; Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1230–31; Schragger, supra note 9, at 
1844–46; see also Laycock, supra note 9, at 775–76, 784. In this Note, “local” government, 
“municipal” government, and “municipalities” are used interchangeably. 
25 See Lighthouse Inst., 510 F.3d at 266–69; Primera Iglesia, 450 F.3d at 1308–11; Konikov, 
410 F.3d at 1324–25; Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1230–31; Schragger, supra note 9, at 
1844–46; see also Laycock, supra note 9, at 775–76, 784. 
26 See infra notes 29–39 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 40–88 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 89–130 and accompanying text. 
29 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 714 (2005); see 146 Cong. Rec. 16,702 (2000) 
(statement of Sen. Reid). 
30 RFRA of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (formerly codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000bb-1 to 2000bb-4 (1994)), invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 
(1997). 
31 RFRA § 3 (formerly codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1994)). 
32 521 U.S. at 536. 
33 Id. at 532. 
34 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006). 
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the RLUIPA involving the Fourteenth and First Amendments, statutory 
construction, local land-use regulation, federalism, and religious lib-
erty.35 
 Plaintiffs can sue under numerous provisions of RLUIPA, which 
are broadly categorized into the “Substantial Burden” (§ 2000cc(a)) 
and the “Equal Terms” (§ 2000cc(b), or “Discrimination and Exclu-
sion”) sections.36 Under the Substantial Burden section, the govern-
ment must justify land-use regulations that substantially burden the re-
ligious exercise of a person, assembly, or institution by showing that the 
regulation is “in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” 
and “is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling gov-
ernmental interest.”37 Under the Equal Terms section, religious institu-
tions must be treated as well as comparable secular institutions.38 Fur-
thermore, zoning ordinances may not discriminate among religions, 
totally exclude religious assemblies from a jurisdiction, or unreasonably 
limit houses of worship.39 
B. The Courts and the Confused Application of RLUIPA Within the Framework 
of Power and Control 
 The principal challenges to RLUIPA are to the Substantial Burden 
and Equal Terms provisions.40 In court, the diverse applications of the-
se provisions reflect a conflict over whether municipalities or religious 
institutions should control land-use regulations.41 This conflict con-
tributes to the confusion as to how to apply RLUIPA consistently.42 
                                                                                                                      
35 See generally Anthony Lazzaro Minervini, Comment, Freedom from Religion: RLUIPA, 
Religious Freedom, and Representative Democracy on Trial, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 571 (2010) (dis-
cussing RLUIPA’s history and the application of the Equal Terms provision). 
36 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)–(b); DOJ, Report on the Tenth Anniversary of the Reli-
gious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 7 (2010), available at http://www. 
justice.gov/crt/rluipa_report_092210.pdf (noting three categories that fall under the two 
statutory provisions). 
37 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a). 
38 Id. § 2000cc(b). 
39 Id. Plaintiffs need only show one of these to sue under RLUIPA. See id. § 2000cc(a)–
(b). 
40 Sarah Keeton Campbell, Note, Restoring RLUIPA’s Equal Terms Provision, 58 Duke L.J. 
1071, 1073–74 (2009). 
41 See infra notes 43–88 and accompanying text. 
42 See infra notes 43–88 and accompanying text. 
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1. Substantial Burden Provision 
 Courts are fairly consistent in their construction of “substantial 
burden” for the purposes of RLUIPA claims.43 Generally, a substantial 
burden on religious exercise occurs when a plaintiff must forego a reli-
gious precept because of a land-use regulation.44 For example, if a land-
use regulation prevents a church from using a building for religious 
education, church services, etc., that regulation may violate RLUIPA.45 
Nevertheless, in this example and indeed in every RLUIPA case, the 
application of the provision raises the basic question of what amounts 
to a substantial burden.46 Courts have answered this question by look-
ing to the policy regarding control over land-use regulations.47 
 In applying the substantial burden test, courts have regarded the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s 2003 case, Civil Liberties 
for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago (CLUB), as a high-water mark of mu-
nicipal control over land-use regulations.48 In CLUB, the Seventh Cir-
cuit held that a regulation substantially burdened the exercise of relig-
ion if it rendered that exercise “effectively impracticable.”49 The court 
explained that to have held otherwise would have been to require mu-
nicipalities to favor religious land uses by exempting them from land-
use regulations.50 
 Since CLUB, many courts have looked to it for guidance, but have 
not adopted its “effectively impracticable” standard.51 For example, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland in 2008 upheld an ordinance that pre-
vented an institution from putting up a sign.52 The court held that a 
zoning board’s restriction on religious land use is not a substantial bur-
den if the ordinance will only have a “minimal impact” on an institu-
                                                                                                                      
43 Edward W. McClenathan, Swinging the Big Stick: How the Circuits Have Interpreted 
RLUIPA and What Practitioners Need to Know, 36 Real Est. L.J. 405, 425 (2008). 
44 Id. 
45 See Mintz v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield, 424 F. Supp. 2d 309, 318–19 (D. 
Mass. 2006); cf. Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1228 (holding that a regulation that forced 
congregants to walk farther to a synagogue, perhaps preventing the elderly or the ill from 
attending services, was not a substantial burden). 
46 See infra notes 48–66 and accompanying text. 
47 See infra notes 48–66 and accompanying text. 
48 See 342 F.3d at 760–61; McClenathan, supra note 43, at 415–18, 425. 
49 342 F.3d at 761. 
50 Id. at 762. 
51 Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1227; Trinity Assembly of God of Balt. City, Inc. v. Peo-
ple’s Counsel for Balt. Cnty., 962 A.2d 404, 429 n.23 (Md. 2008); see McClenathan, supra 
note 43, at 425. 
52 Trinity Assembly, 962 A.2d at 429. 
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tion’s religious exercise.53 In a footnote, the court refrained from 
adopting CLUB’s high substantial burden threshold.54 Instead, the 
court found an area between “minimal impact” and “effectively imprac-
ticable” in which an ordinance may be construed as having a substantial 
burden.55 
 Likewise, other courts have applied the Substantial Burden provi-
sion by finding an area between “minimal impact” and “effectively im-
practicable.”56 In Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, for example, 
in 2004, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit defined the 
threshold of a substantial burden as a regulation that places “more than 
an inconvenience on religious exercise.”57 The court also declined to 
adopt the CLUB standard and held that a substantial burden is akin to 
pressure which directly coerces the religious adherent to forego reli-
gious precepts or mandates religious conduct.58 That courts have de-
veloped different language to discover what constitutes a substantial 
burden reveals that courts are mired in the gray area between two 
poles: “minimal impact” and “effectively impracticable.”59 
 In deciding cases involving RLUIPA’s Substantial Burden provi-
sion, courts have considered competing concerns: the need to combat 
religious discrimination versus the fear that religious land uses would 
get a free pass to build irrespective of land-use regulations.60 Accord-
ingly, some courts have maintained a high bar for religious plaintiffs 
out of fear that religious organizations would wield too much control 
over land-use regulations.61 For example, the Seventh Circuit, in Petra 
Presbyterian Church v. Village of Northbrook in 2007, expressed a fear that 
                                                                                                                      
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 429 n.23. 
55 Id. at 429 & n.23. 
56 Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1227. 
57 Id. at 1227. 
58 Id. 
59 See supra notes 48–58 and accompanying text. 
60 See Petra Presbyterian, 489 F.3d at 851; CLUB, 342 F.3d at 760–62. Additionally, Con-
gress outlined these competing concerns in the legislative history of RLUIPA. 146 Cong. 
Rec. 16,700 (2000) ( Joint Statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy on RLUIPA) [here-
inafter Joint Statement]. Congress recognized that RLUIPA should not exempt religious 
uses from land-use regulation. Id. (“The General Rule does not exempt religious uses from 
land use regulation; rather, it requires regulators to more fully justify substantial burdens 
on religious exercise.”). Conversely, Congress noted that RLUIPA should force regulators 
to justify substantial burdens on religious exercise so as to curb religious discrimination. Id. 
61 Petra Presbyterian, 489 F.3d at 851; Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1228; CLUB, 342 F.3d 
at 762 (“Otherwise, compliance with RLUIPA would require municipal governments not 
merely to treat religious land uses on an equal footing with nonreligious land uses, but 
rather to favor them in the form of an outright exemption from land-use regulations.”). 
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religious organizations would be free from zoning restrictions of any 
kind.62 By contrast, other courts have looked to the legislative history 
and purpose of the statute to suggest that religious institutions should 
have some recourse against municipalities in the battle over land-use 
regulations.63 For example, the legislative history of RLUIPA reveals a 
concern for the plight of minority religions in light of discriminatory 
zoning practices.64 
 Nevertheless, the use of these policy rationales does not clarify how 
much of a burden amounts to a substantial burden.65 Consequently, 
courts continue to struggle to define substantial burden as somewhere 
between “effectively impracticable” and “minimal impact.”66 
2. Equal Terms Provision 
 Ambiguity in the application of RLUIPA’s provisions is even more 
pronounced in context of the Equal Terms provision.67 Nevertheless, 
the split in courts’ applications reflects the same conflicting concerns 
regarding land-use control.68 
 Suits brought under the Equal Terms provision of RLUIPA largely 
turn on the construction of the “equal terms” language itself.69 In par-
ticular, courts have generally split over whether there is a need to com-
pare institutions in light of a regulatory purpose and whether to apply 
strict liability in face of an Equal Terms provision violation or to first 
conduct a strict scrutiny analysis before issuing a judgment.70 
                                                                                                                      
62 489 F.3d at 851. 
63 See Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y of Yuba City v. Cnty. of Sutter, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 
1153–54 (E.D. Cal. 2003), aff’d, 456 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[The CLUB] test reads quite 
a bit more into the word “substantial” than is warranted by the text, purpose or history of 
the statute.”). 
64 See Joint Statement, supra note 60, at 16,698. The legislative history notes that “new, 
small, or unfamiliar” religious institutions are particularly vulnerable to discriminatory 
land-use regulations. Id. The Joint Statement also noted that discrimination against new 
religious institutions often comes hand in hand with racial discrimination, as in the case of 
black churches and Jewish synagogues. Id. 
65 See Petra Presbyterian, 489 F.3d at 851; Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1228; CLUB, 342 
F.3d at 762; Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 1153–54. 
66 See Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1227; Trinity Assembly, 962 A.2d at 429 & n.23. 
67 See infra notes 71–88 and accompanying text. 
68 See infra notes 71–88 and accompanying text. 
69 See Lighthouse Inst., 510 F.3d at 266–69; Primera Iglesia, 450 F.3d at 1308–11; Konikov, 
410 F.3d at 1324–25; Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1228–35; Campbell, supra note 40, at 
1073–74; Minervini, supra note 35, at 574–75 (discussing RLUIPA’s history and the applica-
tion of the Equal Terms provision). 
70 See Campbell, supra note 40, at 1073–74; Minervini, supra note 35, at 574–75; infra 
notes 73–79 and accompanying text. 
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 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that the 
application of the Equal Terms provision first requires the identifica-
tion of a regulatory purpose and then a comparison of the religious 
assembly to a secular group in light of the identified regulatory pur-
pose.71 A zoning ordinance, in other words, violates the Equal Terms 
provision if secular and religious assemblies do not materially differ 
with regards to the regulatory purpose and the ordinance still treats the 
religious institution worse.72 Furthermore, the Third Circuit held that 
the application of the Equal Terms provision warrants strict liability in 
face of an Equal Terms provision violation, rather than strict scrutiny 
analysis.73 For example, in 2007 in Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism, Inc. 
v. City of Long Branch, in which a religious institution challenged an or-
dinance treating religious institutions on unequal terms, the Third Cir-
cuit held that a court should not undergo a strict scrutiny analysis if an 
ordinance violates the Equal Terms provision.74 
 In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit does not require a court to com-
pare religious with secular uses according to regulatory purposes.75 In-
stead, the Eleventh Circuit has defined any “assembly” broadly as a 
group gathered for a common purpose.76 For example, in 2004, the 
Eleventh Circuit in Midrash Sephardi held that private clubs, like 
churches and synagogues, are assemblies; in other words, religious in-
stitutions should be compared with a broad range of assemblies, includ-
ing private clubs.77 In addition, the Eleventh Circuit held that unequal 
treatment of religious uses calls for strict scrutiny analysis.78 If an ordi-
nance survives strict scrutiny, it does not violate RLUIPA.79 
 Just as courts have struggled between opposite poles in applying 
the Substantial Burden provision of RLUIPA, courts have been similarly 
                                                                                                                      
71 Lighthouse Inst., 510 F.3d at 266–69. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 269. Under the strict liability standard, if a regulation treats religious institu-
tions on less than equal terms compared to nonreligious institutions, the regulation auto-
matically fails under RLUIPA. Id. Under the strict scrutiny standard, however, the finding 
of unequal treatment is not fatal to a land-use regulation if the government can establish 
that the regulation uses a narrowly tailored means of achieving a compelling government 
interest. Primera Iglesia, 450 F.3d at 1308. 
74 Lighthouse Inst., 510 F.3d at 268–73. 
75 See Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1230–31 (construing terms according to their dic-
tionary definitions). 
76 Id. at 1231. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 1232. 
79 See id. 
1098 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:1089 
polarized in their application of the Equal Terms provision.80 Like the 
division over the application of the Substantial Burden provision, the 
circuit split in the application of RLUIPA’s Equal Terms provision also 
reveals the conflict between municipalities and religious institutions 
over land-use control.81 
 On the one hand, the Third Circuit adopted the regulatory pur-
pose test to signal that municipalities should have greater control over 
land-use regulations.82 The Third Circuit in Lighthouse Institute criticized 
the Eleventh Circuit’s broad construction of the Equal Terms provision, 
stating that it would contradict Congress’s intent and give religious in-
stitutions a “free pass” to locate wherever they like.83 The Third Circuit 
looked to the Congressional Record and echoed the position that RLUIPA 
does not grant religious institutions immunity from land-use regula-
tions.84 The Seventh Circuit, in River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Village 
of Hazel Crest in 2010, likewise raised the concern that the Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s test may disproportionately favor religious institutions.85 
 On the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning suggests that 
RLUIPA should grant more power over land use to religious institu-
tions.86 For example, the Eleventh Circuit in Midrash Sephardi defined 
“assembly” in accordance with its dictionary definition to broaden the 
protections afforded to religious institutions under RLUIPA.87 This 
construction of the provision drew on legislators’ intent to protect reli-
gious institutions from discrimination.88 
C. Scholarship on RLUIPA: Power and Control Theories and  
Qualitative Uncertainty 
 As the courts have vacillated between the different poles of munici-
pal or religious-institutional control over land-use regulations, scholars 
have also framed the discussion in terms of power and control.89 Fur-
thermore, the inconclusiveness of data and resultant ambiguities exac-
                                                                                                                      
80 See supra notes 43–66, 82–88 and accompanying text. 
81 See supra notes 82–88 and accompanying text. 
82 See Lighthouse Inst., 510 F.3d at 268. 
83 Id. 
84 Id.; see Joint Statement, supra note 60, at 16,700 (“This Act does not provide religious 
institutions with immunity from land-use regulations . . . .”). 
85 611 F.3d at 370. 
86 See Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1231 & n.14. 
87 Id. at 1230–31. 
88 See id. at 1231 n.14. 
89 See infra notes 91–119 and accompanying text. 
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erbates the divide in the scholarship on appropriate application of 
RLUIPA.90 
1. The Divide in the Scholarship on RLUIPA According to Power and 
Control 
 Theorists on RLUIPA largely fall into two categories.91 The first 
expresses concern that RLUIPA, as a federal act, confers too much 
power on the federal government and, relatedly, to religious institu-
tions.92 The second group expresses a distrust of local governments.93 
 One group of scholars raises several concerns over the federaliza-
tion of religious liberty as a check on local control.94 First, these schol-
ars are skeptical of the concentration of power at the federal level.95 In 
particular, they are wary of powerful religious groups influencing fed-
eral lawmakers.96 These scholars also raise the problem of special inter-
est groups controlling local governments through federal legislation.97 
 Second, these scholars point to the particular virtues of letting lo-
cal governments tailor zoning regulations.98 For example, one scholar 
argues that local governments are better able to balance the secular 
and religious needs of a community and that many local governments 
already exempt religious uses from certain regulations.99 Even if there 
is religious discrimination at the local level, in other words, those harms 
are fairly localized and contained.100 Conversely, a centralized, federal 
act like RFRA or RLUIPA is far from narrowly tailored to balance reli-
gious and secular interests.101 Rather, such a blanket appropriation of 
privilege raises Establishment Clause concerns, as it might treat reli-
gious institutions as a favored class under the law.102 
 By contrast, another group of scholars points to the need to com-
bat discrimination at the local level and expresses a distrust of munici-
                                                                                                                      
90 See infra notes 120–130 and accompanying text. 
91 See infra notes 92–119 and accompanying text. 
92 See infra notes 94–102 and accompanying text. 
93 See infra notes 103–116 and accompanying text. 
94 See Hamilton, supra note 9, at 1082–83; Schragger, supra note 9, at 1844–46. 
95 See Hamilton, supra note 9, at 1082–83; Schragger, supra note 9, at 1844–46. 
96 See Hamilton, supra note 9, at 1082–83; Schragger, supra note 9, at 1844–46. 
97 See Hamilton, supra note 9, at 1082–83; Schragger, supra note 9, at 1844–45. 
98 See Schragger, supra note 9, at 1846–47; Marci Hamilton, Struggling with Churches as 
Neighbors, FindLaw ( Jan. 17, 2002), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20020117.html. 
99 See Schragger, supra note 9, at 1846. 
100 See id. 
101 See id. at 1846–47. 
102 See id. at 1847. 
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pal governments.103 These scholars raise a number of concerns with the 
local zoning process with regard to religious discrimination.104 First, 
these scholars point to the subjectivity inherent in the process, which 
exacerbates the problem of discrimination.105 One scholar notes that 
there are no objective measures for zoning ordinances.106 Said differ-
ently, zoning officials make typical zoning decisions, such as whether to 
issue variances, special-use permits, etc., on a discretionary, ad hoc ba-
sis.107 Furthermore, this subjectivity is exacerbated by the fact that zon-
ing officials often have no training or planning experience.108 
 Thus, the highly subjective nature of the zoning process also 
makes the zoning procedure susceptible to authorities or local con-
stituencies’ latent discriminatory attitudes.109 Douglas Laycock, a 
known scholar in the area of religious land use, cites a Gallup Poll to 
observe that many Americans have demonstrated public hostility to 
“fundamentalists” and minority religions.110 He goes on to state that 
the “hostile attitudes are real . . . and individualized processes under 
vague standards give such attitudes ample opportunity for expres-
n
legislature, which must broker compromises between dispa-
te 
discrimination often lurks behind stated reasons for land-use regula-
                                                                                                                     
sio .”111 
 This subjective, ad hoc, decision-making process, furthermore, 
lacks the proper procedural safeguards.112 For example, one scholar 
notes that zoning decisions can be issued without findings of fact or 
statements of reasons.113 Because of their small size, local zoning 
boards are more susceptible to a certain group’s political capture than 
the larger 
ra interests.114 
 Finally, Congress and scholars have also observed that instances of 
discrimination are hard to prove.115 For example, Congress stated that 
 
103 See Laycock, supra note 9, at 775–76; Ostrow, supra note 9, at 735–37. 
104 See Laycock, supra note 9, at 775–76; Ostrow, supra note 9, at 735–37. 
105 See, e.g., Ostrow, supra note 9, at 735–37. 
106 See id. at 735. 
107 See id. at 735–36. 
108 See id. at 735–37. 
109 See Laycock, supra note 9, at 775–76; Ostrow, supra note 9, at 736–37. 
110 Laycock, supra note 9, at 775–76. 
111 Id. 
112 See Ostrow, supra note 9, at 736–37. 
113 See id. 
114 See id. 
115 See Joint Statement, supra note 60, at 16,699; Laycock, supra note 9, at 776. 
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tion, such as traffic or aesthetic improvement, or general inconsistency 
with a city’s land-use plan.116 
 The way the debate is framed, however, has driven the discussion 
on RLUIPA into an either/or, paradoxical conundrum.117 Either 
RLUIPA affords too much power to religious institutions or risks dis-
criminating against religious institutions.118 Scholars, however, have not 
trusted any one institution to create balanced zoning regulations.119 
2. The Ambiguity of Inconclusive Data 
 Another source of tension in the scholarship on RLUIPA concerns 
the empirical data regarding discrimination against minority religions 
in land-use regulations.120 The discrepancy in the data also contributes 
to the polarization of the scholarship on RLUIPA’s appropriateness as a 
federal act.121 
 At first glance, the legislative history shows that discrimination 
against minority religions is indeed a national problem.122 For example, 
the Joint Statement of Senator Orrin Hatch and Senator Ted Kennedy 
drew upon nationwide surveys of cases, anecdotal evidence, and schol-
arly literature to conclude that there is “massive evidence” that religious 
institutions are being discriminated against in land-use matters.123 
Douglass Laycock, one scholar the Senators drew upon in particular, 
cites various studies to demonstrate that minority religious institutions, 
as compared to traditional faith groups, are more likely to litigate cases 
based on discriminatory zoning practices; this, according to Laylock, 
indicated that minority religious groups are more likely to face illegal 
discrimination than traditional faith groups.124 
                                                                                                                      
 
116 See Joint Statement, supra note 60, at 16,698. Laycock also argues, however, that 
federal or state legislation cannot magically solve the problem of discrimination at the 
local level. See Laycock, supra note 9, at 783–84. Rather, having legislation would replace 
the need to prove overt discrimination by instead showing a substantial burden on an insti-
tution’s exercise of religion. See id. Furthermore, enacting legislation is only the beginning. 
See id. Through vigorous litigation of religious land-use matters under statutes like 
RLUIPA, Laycock argues that political and economic incentives will help empower local 
authorities in ensuring the constitutional rights of religious institutions. See id. 
117 See supra notes 91–116 and accompanying text. 
118 See supra notes 91–116 and accompanying text. 
119 See supra notes 91–116 and accompanying text. 
120 See infra notes 122–130 and accompanying text. 
121 See infra notes 122–130 and accompanying text. 
122 Joint Statement, supra note 60, at 16,698–99. 
123 Id. 
124 Laycock, supra note 9, at 761 & n.16, 770–74 (citing RLPA of 1998: Hearing on H.R. 
4019 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 
1102 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:1089 
 Many scholars criticized this evidence and proposed that religious 
discrimination in land-use regulation is not a problem, or at least not a 
national one.125 Some scholars criticized the “massive evidence” Con-
gress compiled as too anecdotal.126 Furthermore, they proposed that 
the reason that minority faith groups litigate land-use matters is be-
cause traditional faith groups already have sufficient worship space.127 
 Moreover, other scholars offered their own empirical evidence to 
discount the idea that discrimination against religious institutions in 
zoning practices exists.128 For example, one scholar studied the zoning 
patterns before RLUIPA’s enactment in New Haven, Connecticut and 
found that the zoning board did not distinguish between religious and 
secular land uses or between minority and mainstream religions.129 
Parking concerns and neighborhood character in fact played the great-
est roles in shaping regulations that affected church behavior.130 
II. Law and Economics of RLUIPA 
 Courts and scholars have struggled to provide sufficient protection 
for religious institutions without affording them too much protec-
tion.131 Courts and scholars have typically framed this tension in terms 
of who should control land-use regulations: municipalities or religious 
institutions.132 A law and economics approach, however, can recast the 
                                                                                                                      
100 (1998); Religious Liberty Protection Act: Compilation of Zoning Provisions 
Affecting Churches in 29 Suburbs of Northern Cook County by John W. Mauck as 
of 7/10/1998 Based upon 1995 Published Standards 7 (1998), available at http:// 
judiciary.house.gov/legacy/mauck.pdf)). 
125 See Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, The Genesis of RLUIPA and Federalism: Evaluating 
the Creation of a Federal Statutory Right and Its Impact on Local Government, 40 Urb. Law. 195, 
256–57 (2008). 
126 Id. at 257. 
127 Id. 
128 Stephen Clowney, Comment, An Empirical Look at Churches in the Zoning Process, 116 
Yale L.J. 859, 868 (2007). 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 See Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 266–
69 (3d Cir. 2007); Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward Cnty., 
450 F.3d 1295, 1308–11 (11th Cir. 2006); Konikov v. Orange Cnty., 410 F.3d 1317, 1324–29 
(11th Cir. 2005); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1230–31 (11th 
Cir. 2004); Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago (CLUB), 342 F.3d 752, 
760–61 (7th Cir. 2003); Laycock, supra note 9, at 775–76; Schragger, supra note 9, at 1844–
47. 
132 See supra notes 40–130 and accompanying text. 
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debate in a new light.133 In particular, one can observe the use of eco-
nomic concepts to balance competing concerns in applying RLUIPA in 
Judge Posner’s opinions.134 These economic principles can help strike 
a compromise in the application of RLUIPA and bridge the divide in 
the scholarship on RLUIPA.135 
                                                                                                                     
 Section A first outlines a brief history of law and economics to nar-
row the focus of this Note.136 Then, Section B discusses how economics 
can be a useful approach to understand (1) discrimination, (2) antidis-
crimination legislation, and thus (3) legislation aimed at antidiscrimi-
nation in the context of religious land use.137 With this as a foundation, 
Section C observes the use of some economic concepts in Judge Pos-
ner’s decisions and how these concepts are applied to strike a balance 
between competing concerns.138 
 This Part draws on the writings and decisions of Judge Posner.139 
Although there may be other economic approaches to RLUIPA, limit-
ing this Part to the writings of one individual offers a consistent, alter-
native approach to the application of RLUIPA.140 
A. Law and Economics—A Brief History 
 The history of law and economics as a discipline can be broadly 
traced to two branches.141 The first branch concerns the economic 
analysis of laws regulating markets.142 Over time, the economic analysis 
of laws governing markets developed as economics gathered steam and 
government regulation expanded, starting with Adam Smith’s com-
ments on trade through the rich body of antitrust economics devel-
 
133 See River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 369–71 
(7th Cir. 2010) (en banc); World Outreach Conference Ctr. v. City of Chicago, 591 F.3d 
531, 539 (7th Cir. 2009); Saints Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church, Inc. v. City 
of New Berlin, 396 F.3d 895, 899–901 (7th Cir. 2005); Richard A. Posner, The Econom-
ics of Justice 351–63 (1981). 
134 See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 369–71; World Outreach, 591 F.3d at 539; Saints Constan-
tine, 396 F.3d at 899–901. 
135 See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 369–71; World Outreach, 591 F.3d at 539; Saints Constan-
tine, 396 F.3d at 899–901. 
136 See infra notes 141–154 and accompanying text. 
137 See infra notes 155–173 and accompanying text. 
138 See infra notes 174–229 and accompanying text. 
139 See infra notes 141–229 and accompanying text. 
140 See infra notes 141–229 and accompanying text. 
141 Richard Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 281, 
281–84 (1979). 
142 Id. at 281–82. 
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oped in the past century.143 The second branch concerns the econom-
ics of nonmarket, legal regulation.144 In this second branch, Gary 
Becker’s article on the economics of discrimination, Ronald Coase’s 
article on social cost, and Guido Calabresi’s article on tort law and risk 
distribution are the milestones.145 This second branch is significant par-
ticularly against the backdrop of a shift towards scientific analysis of 
nonmarket behavior.146 
 Furthermore, the field of law and economics draws a distinction 
between a normative and positive analysis of the law.147 Although a pos-
itive analysis of the law can contribute to normative considerations 
(e.g., how much weight to give to a certain behavior-altering incentive), 
the economic analysis itself does not necessarily lead to normative pol-
icy recommendations.148 An economic analysis of the law simply ques-
tions the behaviors regulated by, and patterns within, a system.149 
 This Note merely observes the use of economic principles in Judge 
Posner’s application of RLUIPA.150 In so doing, however, this Note fur-
ther posits that the economic lens yields a different perspective than 
that afforded by a lens focusing on control over land-use regulations.151 
Thus, this economic lens, as a positive observation of system-specific 
effects of zoning in a particular case, can broker a compromise between 
broad political and normative policy objectives in RLUIPA cases.152 
 As a final matter, this Note does not suggest that courts either were 
or were not already developing efficient common law; this Note also 
does not address some scholars’ hypothesis that the common law has 
                                                                                                                      
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 282. 
145 Id. at 283 (citing Gary Becker, The Economics of Discrimination (1959); Guido 
Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale L.J. 499 (1961); 
Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960)). 
146 Id. at 284. This Note, however, will not address the larger controversy regarding the 
application of economics to nonmarket human behavior. See id. at 284 & n.14 (citing Gary 
Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior (1976); Ronald Coase, Economics 
and Contiguous Disciplines, 7 J. Legal Stud. 201 (1978)). 
147 See Posner, supra note 141, at 284–87. 
148 See id. 
149 See id. Thus, one hypothesis is that the common law, like effective competition, 
promotes efficiency. See id. at 288–89. 
150 See infra notes 174–229 and accompanying text. Also, this Note does not conduct an 
economic analysis of RLUIPA’s effect on local zoning systems; rather, this Note simply no-
tices how courts can use an economic perspective to inform other policy objectives at stake 
in a RLUIPA claim. See infra notes 174–229 and accompanying text. 
151 See infra notes 174–229 and accompanying text. 
152 See infra notes 174–229 and accompanying text. 
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developed so as to improve efficiency.153 Rather, this Note draws on the 
language in Judge Posner’s opinions to explore the application of 
RLUIPA from a new perspective.154 
B. Legitimizing an Antidiscrimination Act with Economics 
 As an initial matter, the economic approach can be an appropriate 
method to understand a statute aimed at antidiscrimination for two rea-
sons.155 First, the economic approach legitimizes a prohibition against 
religious discrimination.156 Second, the economic approach legitimizes 
the creation of a healthy, pluralistic, religious marketplace.157 
 First, the economic approach justifies the constitutional prohibi-
tion against racial discrimination by state action that can then be ex-
tended to religious discrimination by local governments in the context 
of RLUIPA.158 In particular, a neutral antidiscrimination principle can 
be justified on economic grounds by identifying the distributive effects 
of discrimination.159 According to the law and economics of discrimi-
nation, Judge Posner, for example, describes the preference not to as-
sociate with certain groups of people as a real cost imposed on those 
with a “taste for discrimination.”160 There are, in addition, economic 
forces at work to minimize discrimination in the competitive market 
because the least prejudiced sellers, who do not discriminate in their 
consumer base, incur less cost to increase their market share.161 Never-
theless, in a regulated market where monopolies are not necessarily 
freely transferrable, market forces may not mitigate the effects of dis-
                                                                                                                      
153 See Posner, supra note 141, at 288–89. Importantly, some laws do not develop in 
keeping with efficiency norms. See Posner, supra note 133, at 355, 362–63. For example, 
because racial discrimination can be seen as an efficient way to lower information costs, 
laws targeted against this efficient yet undesirable behavior do not promote efficiency. Id. 
Importantly, the economic approach can provide a neutral, nondiscrimination principle. 
See i
i. L. Rev. 1 (1989) (taking a thorough economic approach to issues 
of re
anying text. 
 n.1 (citing Becker, supra note 145). 
2. 
d. at 355; infra notes 155–173 and accompanying text. 
154 See infra notes 155–229 and accompanying text. 
155 See infra notes 158–173 and accompanying text. Although this Note suggests that 
the economic perspective is useful in RLUIPA cases, this Note does not go further to con-
duct a more rigorous economic analysis of the effect of RLUIPA on local zoning systems. 
See generally Michael W. McConnell & Richard Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Reli-
gious Freedom, 56 U. Ch
ligious freedom). 
156 See infra notes 158–173 and accompanying text. 
157 See infra notes 169–173 and accomp
158 See Posner, supra note 133, at 358. 
159 Id. at 351–58 &
160 Id. at 351–5
161 Id. at 352. 
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crimination.162 Thus, government regulations, especially discriminatory 
regulations, may increase discrimination above the level that would ex-
ist in an unregulated market.163 
                                                                                                                     
 Furthermore, the economic approach merely considers the redis-
tributive effects of discrimination.164 For example, segregation can be 
viewed as reducing the opportunity of racial and economic minorities 
to engage in valuable interracial associations.165 Under the economic 
view, desegregation is not a way of devaluing the freedom of association 
of racial and economic majorities.166 Rather, the economic approach is 
simply a tool to assess the distributive effects of a given regulation’s 
costs and burdens.167 Properly understood, therefore, the economic 
approach is neutral in that it merely considers the systemic redistribu-
tive effects of discrimination.168 
 Second, the economic approach allows scholars to examine issues 
of religious freedom from the perspective of competition, costs, and 
benefits.169 In Judge Posner’s dissent in Civil Liberties for Urban Believers 
v. City of Chicago (CLUB), he reasoned that “the greater vitality of Ameri-
can religion . . . owes much to our unwillingness to allow government 
to favor particular sects.”170 The focus on competition shifts our atten-
tion away from the gridlock between the poles of favoring religion ver-
sus fighting religious discrimination and identifies a common goal for 
communities and religious institutions alike: the creation of a healthy, 
religious marketplace.171 Furthermore, religious organizations compete 
with each other to confer external benefits on society in the form of 
services for the community.172 The economic approach is thus particu-
larly useful in analyzing issues of religious freedom because it examines 
how the forces of competition, costs, and benefits can converge to fos-
ter a common goal: religious freedom in the marketplace.173 
 
162 Id. at 353. 
163 Id. at 352–58. 
164 See Posner, supra note 133, at 352, 355. 
165 See id. at 355. 
166 See id. 
167 See id. 
168 See id. 
169 CLUB, 342 F.3d at 770 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
170 Id. 
171 See id. 
172 McConnell & Posner, supra note 155, at 2. 
173 Id. 
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C. Economic Principles in the Application of RLUIPA 
 Although courts and scholars have struggled over competing con-
cerns in the application of RLUIPA, Judge Posner’s decisions and dis-
sents offer a number of ways to balance these concerns.174 In a series of 
Seventh Circuit cases, Judge Posner’s opinions reflect a balancing act 
between competing policies that underlie the application of RLUIPA’s 
Substantial Burden and Equal Terms provisions.175 Further, one can 
trace the use of economic concepts in striking this balance between 
competing policy concerns.176 Thus, the economic approach to the 
application of RLUIPA can be a helpful way to recast the debate his-
torically framed in terms of control and power.177 
                                                                                                                     
 The next Section observes the use of economic concepts in Judge 
Posner’s decisions in two ways.178 First, Judge Posner prefers a particu-
larized inquiry in applying the RLUIPA’s Substantial Burden and Equal 
Terms provisions.179 Second, this Part touches on Judge Posner’s idea 
of RLUIPA’s effect on risk distribution.180 
1. The Use of a Particularized Inquiry 
 In applying both the Substantial Burden and Equal Terms provi-
sions of RLUIPA, Judge Posner struck a compromise between compet-
ing views regarding who—municipalities or religious institutions— 
should control land-use regulations by using a fact-intensive inquiry 
 
174 See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 369–71 (balancing competing interests using a new reg-
ulatory criteria test in cases implicating RLUIPA’s Equal Terms provision); World Outreach, 
591 F.3d at 539 (balancing competing interests by weighing a substantial burden against an 
institution’s needs and resources in cases involving RLUIPA’s Substantial Burden provi-
sion); Saints Constantine, 396 F.3d at 899–901 (drawing on the idea of assumption of risk to 
balance municipal or religious-institutional control over land-use regulations). To be fair, 
other courts have also applied RLUIPA in a very fact-intensive manner. See McClenathan, 
supra note 43, at 426. One scholar argued that most courts use the fact-intensive inquiry to 
come to the “right” result. Id. The main difference between those decisions and Judge 
Posner’s opinions is that Judge Posner’s opinions often articulate why and how facts are 
relevant in the balancing act. See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 369–71; World Outreach, 591 F.3d 
at 539; Saints Constantine, 396 F.3d at 899–901. 
175 See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 369–71; World Outreach, 591 F.3d at 539; Saints Constan-
tine, 396 F.3d at 899–901. 
176 See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 369–71; World Outreach, 591 F.3d at 539; Saints Constan-
tine, 396 F.3d at 899–901. 
177 See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 369–71; World Outreach, 591 F.3d at 539; Saints Constan-
tine, 396 F.3d at 899–901. 
178 See infra notes 181–229 and accompanying text. 
179 See infra notes 181–218 and accompanying text. 
180 See infra notes 219–229 and accompanying text. 
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particular to the religious institution and zoning scheme in question.181 
This approach reflects a law and economics approach to zoning.182 Ac-
cording to one scholar’s exposition of the application of the Coase 
Theorem to zoning system, the value judgment of a zoning system is 
specific and particular to each system’s institutional design and rights 
distribution.183 The use of economics thus requires one to refrain from 
a categorical value judgment regarding a land-use regulation.184 Rather, 
as Judge Posner has demonstrated, the application of RLUIPA’s Sub-
stantial Burden and Equal Terms provisions can be value-neutral by 
employing a fact-intensive, particularized approach.185 
a. The Substantial Burden Provision and the System Specific Inquiry 
 In World Outreach Conference Center v. City of Chicago and Saints Con-
stantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church, Inc. v. City of New Berlin, Seventh 
Circuit cases in 2009 and 2005 respectively, Judge Posner discussed the 
competing policy concerns that underlie the alternative applications of 
RLUIPA.186 In Saints Constatine, Judge Posner outlined the competing 
concerns in the application of RLUIPA’s Substantial Burdens provi-
sion.187 First, he took into consideration the concern that the provision 
could give religious institutions too much control over land-use regula-
tions, which may implicate the Constitution’s Establishment Clause.188 
Likewise in World Outreach, he noted that the term “substantial” must be 
interpreted so that churches would not be granted “blanket immunity 
from land-use regulation.”189 But, Judge Posner then counter-argued 
that religious institutions, especially those of a minority religion, are 
                                                                                                                      
181 See infra notes 186–218 and accompanying text. 
182 See Lawrence Lai Wai Chung, The Economics of Land-Use Zoning, 65 Town Plan. Rev., 
no. 1, 1994 at 77, 92. 
183 Id. Thus, an economic analysis of a zoning system would examine, first, the institu-
tional design of the system and, second, the effect of that design on the distribution of 
rights. Id. Furthermore, in an economic analysis of zoning regulations, one would refrain 
from making quick, broad generalizations about all cities and towns; instead, the economic 
approach would be fine-tuned to examine the effect of zoning on the distribution of rights 
in a specific town. See id. Instead, the economic approach would be particularized, fine-
tuned to examine the effect of a system of zoning on the distribution of rights for religious 
institutions. See id. 
184 See id. 
185 See infra notes 186–218 and accompanying text. 
186 See World Outreach, 591 F.3d at 539; Saints Constantine, 396 F.3d at 899–901. 
187 See Saints Constantine, 396 F.3d at 899–901. 
188 See id. at 900. 
189 591 F.3d at 539. 
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vulnerable to subtle forms of discrimination by local zoning officials 
acting without procedural safeguards.190 
 Other courts, as described in Section I.B, have identified a murky 
area between “minimal impact” and “effectively impracticable” where 
an ordinance may be construed as having a substantial burden.191 
Judge Posner, however, defined a flexible, fact-intensive compromise 
between the two poles: 
fe 
                                                                                                                     
We shall assume that determining whether a burden is sub-
stantial (and if so whether it is nevertheless justifiable) is or-
dinarily an issue of fact (oddly we cannot find a reported 
opinion that addresses the question) and that substantiality is 
a relative term—whether a given burden is substantial de-
pends on its magnitude in relation to the needs and resources 
of the religious organization in question.192 
 In other words, what hits the moving target between “minimal im-
pact” and “effectively impracticable” depends on the individual needs 
of the religious institution.193 For example, in World Outreach, Judge 
Posner outlined the needs and resources of the particular religious or-
ganization to assess the weight of the burden imposed on the 
church.194 In that case, the court upheld the landmark designation that 
prevented the church from demolishing an apartment house.195 The 
court determined that the costs to the church were modest and that 
those costs could be offset by the prospect of selling the landmark and 
putting the proceeds towards the proposed construction of a family-li
center.196 
 In Saints Constantine, Judge Posner conducted a similar cost analy-
sis and held that an ordinance imposed a substantial burden.197 Fur-
 
190 Saints Constantine, 396 F.3d at 900 (citing Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 
(1990); Akers v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 1030, 1041–42 (6th Cir. 2003); CLUB, 342 F.3d at 764; 
Am. Jewish Congress v. City of Beverly Hills, 90 F.3d 379, 383–86 (9th Cir. 1996) (en 
banc)). 
191 See supra notes 43–66 and accompanying text. 
192 World Outreach, 591 F.3d at 539 (citing Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 
504 F.3d 338, 349 (2d Cir. 2007); Vision Church v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 999–
1000 (7th Cir. 2006)). 




197 Saints Constantine, 396 F.3d at 899–901; see also Westchester Day Sch., 504 F.3d at 352 
(using a particularized inquiry to take the distribution of costs in a zoning system into 
account). 
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thermore, Judge Posner fine-tuned the balancing act in the competi-
tion for control over land-use regulations by likening the substantial 
burden analysis to the disparate-impact theory of employment dis-
crimination.198 In so doing, Judge Posner reasoned that a finding of a 
substantial burden merely raises the inference of discrimination.199 
alities or religious institu-
d that it required 
ur
tion of a religious insti-
tio
                                                                   
b. The Equal Terms Provision and the Particularized Inquiry 
 In River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Village of Hazel Crest, a 2010, en 
banc Seventh Circuit case, Judge Posner wrote for the majority to ad-
dress the competing concerns over the application of RLUIPA’s Equal 
Terms provisions.200 As in the Substantial Burdens context, Judge Pos-
ner turned to a flexible inquiry to strike a compromise between com-
peting policies regarding whether municip
tions should control land-use regulations.201 
 In River of Life, Judge Posner discussed the Eleventh and Third 
Circuits’ different constructions of the Equal Terms provision.202 On 
the one hand, the court criticized the broad reading of the term “as-
sembly” as one that may grant preferential treatment to religious land 
uses and violate the Establishment Clause.203 In addition, the court crit-
icized the construction of the term as being so broa
co ts to compare incommensurable uses of land.204 
 In equal part, the court also expressed its concerns with the Third 
Circuit’s application of the Equal Terms provision.205 In particular, the 
court explained that the Third Circuit’s application allowed self-serving 
zoning officials to disguise systematic discrimina
tu n under the “regulatory purpose” guise.206 
 In an effort to balance the two approaches, the court formed the 
“accepted zoning criteria” test—a particularized approach.207 The test 
states that “[i]f a church and a community center, though different in 
many respects, do not differ with respect to any accepted zoning crite-
rion, then an ordinance that allows one and forbids the other denies 
                                                   




r of Life, 611 F.3d at 371. 
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equality and violates the equal terms provision.”208 In looking to these 
“accepted zoning criteria,” the court reasoned that the concept of 
equality in the land-use context must be measured against objective 
cto




sion, judges would apply an objective, yet flexible standard.218 
A
                                                                                                                     
fa rs.209 
 Furthermore, a judge should conduct this particularized inquiry.210 
For example, the main difference between the accepted zoning criteria 
and regulatory purposes tests is that, at trial, a federal judge would de-
termine certain objective, regulatory, zoning criteria as opposed to tak-
ing the regulatory purposes put forth by zoning officials at face value.211 
Put differently, the court in River of Life followed the Third Circuit’s nar-
row reading of “assembly,” but shifted the focus from the stated regula-
tory purpose (which would have been taken at face value) to objective 
regulatory criteria (which a judge would determine).212 In this way, a 
court would avoid the hazards of subjective and potentially self-serving 
testimonies by local officials.213 Rather, t
judge-determined, objective standards.214 
 Finally, the court did not adopt the Eleventh Circuit’s use of the 
strict scrutiny analysis.215 The court reasoned that the analysis lacked 
textual basis and would only have been required to counterb
E enth Circuit’s over-protection of religious institutions.216 
 Thus, the “accepted zoning criteria” test would allow judges to act 
in the place of Congress when striking a compromise with municipali-
ties in the application of RLUIPA.217 In a vein similar to Judge Posner’s 
articulation of the proper application of the substantial burde
2. ssumption of Risk 
 In both the application of the Substantial Burdens and Equal 
Terms provisions, Judge Posner invokes the concept of assumption of 
 
stating that “it is federal judges who will apply the criteria to resolve the issue”). 






212 See River of Life, 611 F
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214 Id. 
215 Id. at 370–71. 
216 Id. 
217 See id. 
218 See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 371. 
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risk.219 In Petra Presbyterian Church v. Village of Northbrook, the Seventh 
Circuit drew on Saints Constantine to affirm that, once an organization 
has bought property “reasonably expecting to obtain a permit,” the 
subsequent denial of the permit may constitute a substantial burden.220 
In Petra Presbyterian, however, the court held that the institution did not 
reasonably expect to obtain a permit.221 Rather, the institution assumed 
the risk that they would not be granted a permit and so the denial of 
e p
continue to prohibit religious uses on a certain 
iec
                                                                                                                     
th ermit did not constitute a substantial burden.222 
 In the same case, Judge Posner used the assumption of risk con-
cept in applying the Equal Terms provision.223 Although a previous or-
dinance may conceivably have violated RLUIPA’s Equal Terms provi-
sion, the court held that the plaintiff institution “knew or should have 
known” that the town could change its ordinance to comply with the 
Equal Terms provision in two ways.224 First, the town could permit reli-
gious organizations in the zone; second, the town could forbid all 
membership organizations in the zone.225 The court held that the insti-
tution could not reasonably assume that the municipality would choose 
the first option, and therefore did not reasonably rely on the illegality 
of the previous ordinance.226 Thus, the institution assumed the risk that 
an ordinance could 
p e of property.227 
 Petra Presbyterian evinces a reluctance to apply RLUIPA to provide 
plaintiffs with insurance against risky behavior in the marketplace for 
 
219 Petra Presbyterian Church v. Vill. of Northbrook, 489 F.3d 846, 849–51 (7th Cir. 
of Investment-Backed Expectations in Total Regulatory Taking Claims, 
49 B e use of investment-backed expectations in total 
regu aking cases). 
 Presbyterian, 489 F.3d at 851. 
t 849. 
89 F.3d at 849. 
2007). Although the concept is used in other areas such as torts, the application of the 
assumption of risk concept in zoning cases can be pursued further. See generally Calabresi, 
supra note 145 (applying the idea of risk distribution to tort law). Also, analogues in the 
law on takings provide a fruitful comparison. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe 
Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 315 (2002); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 
1003, 1034 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 
438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); John E. Fee, The Takings Clause as a Comparative Right, 76 S. Cal. 
L. Rev. 1003, 1037 (2003). See generally John A. Kupiec, Note, Returning to Principles of “Fair-
ness and Justice”: The Role 
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pro n 
protecti end its 
rot
lysis, especially under the Equal Terms provision, may be 
insufficient for making finer, factual distinctions.231 Second, like the 




Hazel Crest—a 2010 en banc Seventh Circuit opinion—and stated that 
                                                                                                                     
perty.228 In this way, Judge Posner affirms the role of RLUIPA i
ng institutions against discrimination, but does not ext
p ection to economically risky behavior.229 
III. The Economic Approach to the Application of RLUIPA,  
Its Limits, and Its Effect on the Balance of Power 
 Although Judge Posner’s use of economic concepts is a way to re-
solve the tension regarding whether local governments or religious in-
stitutions should control land-use regulations, his opinions unearth 
new tensions in the application of RLUIPA.230 First, Judge Posner’s 
RLUIPA ana
wer framework, Judge Posner’s economic a
ge ral also does not provide clear guidance for the application of 
RLUIPA.232 
A. The Limits of RLUIPA’s Equal Terms Provision 
 In cases involving commercially zoned areas, the language of 
Judge Posner’s opinions suggests that RLUIPA’s Equal Terms provision 
is ill-fitted for dealing with finer, factual distinctions.233 In par
co mercially zoned areas that are not purely commercial complicate 
the Seventh Circuit’s “accepted zoning criteria” test.234 Thus, Judge 
Posner’s application of RLUIPA’s Equal Terms provisions falls short of 
the particularized analysis the economic approach advocates.235 
 Judge Posner recently discussed the right of a municipality to fos-
ter commercial growth by creating zones that are purely commercial.236 
He wrote for the majority in River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Village of 
 
228 See id. at 849–51. 
03) (Posner, J., dissenting) (dissenting on equal protec-
tion
 See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 372–74; CLUB, 342 F.3d at 768–74 (Posner, J., dissent-
ing)
 See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 372–74; CLUB, 342 F.3d at 768–74 (Posner, J., dissent-
ing)
, 611 F.3d at 372–73. 
229 See id. 
230 See infra notes 233–273 and accompanying text. 
231 See infra notes 233–257 and accompanying text. 
232 See infra notes 259–273 and accompanying text. 
233 See River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 372–74 
(7th Cir. 2010) (en banc); Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago (CLUB), 
342 F.3d 752, 768–74 (7th Cir. 20





236 River of Life
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“it seems clear that industry and commerce are also necessary and de-
sirable and that a proper environment for them will promote the gen-
y not be neatly 
har
mercially zoned areas.244 Second, the 
                                                                                                                     
eral welfare of the public.”237 Thus, claims brought under RLUIPA’s 
Equal Terms provision against ordinances that purport to create a 
purely commercial zone are likely to fail.238 
 At the end of the opinion, however, Judge Posner suggested that 
the accepted zoning criteria test was limited and did not account for 
cases involving variances and special-use permits that blur an area’s 
character.239 In those cases, the area in question ma
c acterized as a purely “commercial district” or a “residential dis-
trict.”240 Judge Posner further emphasized that there are other, more 
effective grounds to challenge RLUIPA’s validity.241 
 One such ground is the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which Judge Posner relied on in dissenting in Civil Liber-
ties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago (CLUB).242 In CLUB, Judge Pos-
ner was faced exactly with the sort of factually difficult situation imag-
ined, wherein a commercially zoned area already has mixed uses.243 
First, Judge Posner noted that the City of Chicago already had mixed 
uses (including churches) in com
zoning ordinance in CLUB simply required special-use permits to oper-
ate in a commercially zoned area; it was not a categorical ban of non-
commercial uses as in River of Life.245 
 In his dissent, Judge Posner concluded that the zoning regulation 
that treated religious uses differently to achieve commercial purposes 
violated the Equal Protection Clause.246 In particular, Judge Posner 
noted that, when a land-use regulation targets churches, the risk of dis-
crimination against particular sects, not against religious uses generally, 
warrants “more careful judicial scrutiny” than regular equal protection 
challenges.247 Furthermore, Judge Posner stated that the ordinance did 





F.3d at 768 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
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237 Id. at 372. 
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240 See id. at 37
241 Id. at 374. 
242 342 F.3d at 768–74. 
243 See id. at 771–72; see also River of Life, 611 F.3d at 373
244 CLUB, 342 F.3d at 771–72 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
245 See id. at 771; see also River of Life, 611 F.3d at 368. 
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ordinance that makes it expensive for minority churches to build in 
commercially zoned areas disparately impacts minority churches as 
compared to well-known sects.249 This was because the entry costs of 
minority religions into the religious marketplace would be lower if they 
could open “storefront” churches in a commercial zone.250 Thus, even 
 of the zone and the ordinance.254 Furthermore, the 
se o
e immune 
from local zoning laws) and so courts are required to read new mean-
ing into d reli-
gious-institutional int PA.257 
                                                                                                                     
though the prohibition against religious uses was not absolute, the 
mechanism by which municipalities imposed prohibitive cost burdens 
on marginal institutions violated the Equal Protection Clause.251 
 In light of this alternative method, the Seventh Circuit’s “accepted 
zoning criterion” test reveals the analysis’s limitations in allowing judges 
to take into account finer, factual differences.252 Judges following the 
Seventh Circuit’s test will constantly be required to read meaning into 
RLUIPA’s text and redefine “zoning criterion” when faced with zones 
that are not purely commercial.253 By contrast, the use of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause allowed Judge Posner to take into account the factually 
ambiguous nature
u f the Equal Protection Clause allowed for a more detailed inquiry 
into particular costs to religious minorities, not just to religious land 
uses generally.255 
 In a similar vein, one scholar looked to the text of RLUIPA to ar-
gue that the overly broad language of RLUIPA has caused considerable 
confusion in the courts.256 Furthermore, this result is at odds with the 
legislative intent (that religious institutions should not b
 the text to try to strike a balance between municipal an
erests in the application of RLUI
 
t 770–71. 
 See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 372–74; CLUB, 342 F.3d at 768–74 (Posner, J., dissent-
ing)
 at 768–74 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
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253 See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 373–74. 
254 See CLUB, 342 F.3d
255 See id. at 768–74. 
256 See Daniel P. Lennington, Thou Shalt Not Zone: The Overbroad Applications and Trou-
bling Implicati
6). 
257 See id. 
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B. The Economic Approach to the Application of RLUIPA and  
Its Effect on the Balance of Power 
 One can also examine the effect of the economic approach in ap-
plying RLUIPA as compared to the debate framed in terms of power 
and control.258 Although the economic approach refracts the debate to 
allow for a compromise between competing concerns over whether 
municipalities or religious institutions should control land-use regula-
tions, the economic approach introduces new tensions in the balance 
f po 259o wer.  
 In particular, the use of economic principles takes power out of 
the hands of local governments and religious institutions and places it 
into the hands of courts.260 For example, the new test proposed by the 
Seventh Circuit in River of Life would require judges to determine regu-
latory objectives.261 Likewise, in the substantial burden context, judges 
would be heavily engaged in a particularized inquiry.262 
 This shift in power reveals the limitations of an economic approach 
in applying RLUIPA’s provisions.263 In particular, judges may be ill-
equipped to use economic principles to apply RLUIPA’s provisions.264 
For example, as Judge Ann Williams rose in her dissent in River of Life, 
the Seventh Circuit’s test is vague and difficult for judges to apply.265 
Furthermore, under the Seventh Circuit’s test, judges may look to local 
officials’ stated regulatory purposes anyway in determining a regulatory 
objective.266 Finally, zoning officials could still couch discriminatory zon-
ing policies in terms of accepted regulatory objectives.267 
 Further, this shift in the balance of power is accompanied by a 
bro lance of power between 
the
sing on the system-specific distributive effects of a 
                                 
ader tension when viewed in light of the ba
 federal government and municipalities.268 In fact, judges may end 
up eschewing the legitimacy of a federal act intended to solve a nation-
wid cue problem by fo
                                                                                     
nfra notes 260–273 and accompanying text. 
tes 260–273 and accompanying text. 
611 F.3d at 371; World Outreach Conference Ctr. v. City of Chicago, 
591 1, 539 (7th Cir. 2009) (suggesting that judges would be required to do more 
fact
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 See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 376–77 (Williams, J., concurring). 
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 Id. at 376. 
 Id. at 376–77. 
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 See infra notes 269–273 and accompanying text. 
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zoning regulation.269 Consequently, the economic approach may bol-
ster the position of scholars who propose that local governments are 
ette
ional intent to provide federal protection for 
religious institutions.273 
eaningless, but rather 
oin
b r able to balance community-specific concerns.270 
 Finally, this tension is further exacerbated by the inconclusiveness 
of the data regarding discrimination against religious institutions.271 In 
the context of RLUIPA, courts are faced with various, conflicting sets of 
data on the distributive effects of zoning regulations in both the local 
and federal contexts.272 This highlights the need to carefully consider 
how exactly courts should take into account system-specific data while 
respecting the congress
Conclusion 
 Given the limitations of RLUIPA and its potential to disturb the 
balance of power, the use of economic analysis is not an instant way to 
resolve the tensions inherent in RLUIPA’s application. Nevertheless, 
the use of economic concepts can still guide a more balanced discus-
sion and application of RLUIPA. Thus, the limitations of RLUIPA do 
not render the economic approach of RLUIPA m
p t out flaws even in the alternative approach. 
 First, there must be a more nuanced understanding of the balance 
of power between religious institutions, municipalities, and the federal 
government. In particular, this understanding should take into account 
the role of the courts in either upsetting or correcting this balance of 
power in the context of religious discrimination. Second, there should 
be a more rigorous economic study of the effect of zoning and of 
RLUIPA cases on the distribution of rights. This Note merely points out 
the use of economic concepts and the analysis is a far cry from a de-
tailed, scientific inquiry. Such an inquiry would involve a rigorous eco-
                                                                                                                      
269 Joint Statement, supra note 60, at 16,699. In relevant part, the Congressional Record 
provides: 
The discrimination against religious uses is a nationwide problem. It does not 
occur in every jurisdiction with land use authority, but it occurs in many such 
jurisdictions throughout the nation. Where it occurs, it is often covert. It is 
impossible to make separate findings about every jurisdiction, or to legislate 
in a way that reaches only those jurisdictions that are guilty. 
Id. 
270 See Schragger, supra note 9, at 1846–47; Hamilton, supra note 98. 
271 See supra notes 120–130 and accompanying text. 
272 See supra notes 120–130 and accompanying text. 
273 See supra notes 120–130 and accompanying text. 
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estions of 
whether RLUIPA is actually an effective means to com
crimination. 
 As of now, RLUIPA’s efficacy seems limited, and the discussion 
about its usefulness is deadlocked. By looking at the issues through 
multiple lenses, however, perhaps we can discover a new avenue in the 
fight against religious discrimination in land-use regulations. 
Tokufumi Noda 
nomic analysis of RLUIPA’s effect on local zoning systems. Further-
more, this sort of inquiry can help scholars answer the qu
bat religious dis-
